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Abstract
In markets where product quality is important, more than one characteristic
is usually necessary to define product quality and the amelioration of the
goods characteristics is usually costly. Then, properties of production tech-
nologies, in particular if they exhibit economies or diseconomies of scope in
producing quality along several dimensions, should matter for the industry
configuration at equilibrium. To date, however, the literature has neglected
the issue. We analyze a duopoly model where two characteristics can be used
to vertically diﬀerentiate the products. Our results are that the existence of
economies of scope (resp. diseconomies of scope) leads to the emergence of
a quality leader in all dimensions (resp. to a diﬀerent quality leader in each
characteristic).
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1 Introduction
Oligopolistic industries are often characterized by fierce competition on qual-
ity. In theory, quality of a good relates strictly speaking to attributes which
can be measured and which, if increased, increase consumers’ satisfaction.
Often firms claim about the superior quality of their products, however,
there can be several characteristics which aﬀect quality. In statements to the
public each firm emphasizes the strong points of its product. However, most
theory models only allow for one quality dimension. If one considers quality
as represented by one parameter only, then the theory predicts that firms will
diﬀerentiate in that attribute. This is perhaps the best known result of the
literature on vertical diﬀerentiation1 originated by Gabszewicz and Thisse
(1979) and Shaked and Sutton (1982, 1983). If two vertical attributes exist,
only one of them will be used to diﬀerentiate and the other will be equal
across firms (see Neven and Thisse, 1990; Vandenbosch and Weinberg, 1995;
Dos Santos Ferreira and Thisse, 1996). One should then expect that qual-
ity leaders emerge among firms, while followers sell goods of inferior quality.
This is consistent with what we observe in many but not all markets and
hence this theory description does not seem to exhaust the industry config-
urations which could be encountered in an empirical analysis. Surely there
are cases where some firm succeeds to be a leader in all attributes of the
product it makes, but often the products on the market are characterized by
diﬀerent quality levels in diﬀerent dimensions. A brand of Hi-Fi system with
excellent sound may have poor electronic facilities incorporated, as opposed
to a rival brand with the opposite pattern of characteristics. We shall analyze
the particular case where products have two vertical quality attributes: one
which is desirable at the same degree by every consumer, and the other that
corresponds to the definition of a hedonic characteristic: consumers desire
more of it but with diﬀerent intensity2.
A first guess is that technology should matter for what is the equilibrium
configuration. For instance one could assume that quality leadership in all di-
1For the case of horizontal diﬀerentiation, multicharacteristics models exist. Irmen
and Thisse (1998) find maximum diﬀerentiation along one dimension, while minimum
diﬀerentiation is observed along all other dimensions. Vendorp and Majeed (1995) and
Tabuchi (1994) obtains a similar result in a bidimensional setting. For mixed models with
a horizontal and a vertical dimension see Ha¨ckner (2000) and Garella and Petrakis (2008).
2The non hedonic variable has the same utility as money in our example. In the real
world one may think of fuel eﬃciency in cars as an illustrative example.
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mensions is easier to achieve under a complementarity assumption: when the
improvement in one dimension reduces the costs of making improvements in
the others, a case that we shall define of ”scope economies”. Vice versa, if the
cost eﬀect are reversed, one would presume that absolute quality leadership
should not prevail. The aim of the present paper is to relate the equilibrium
outcome to ”economies of scope” in producing quality along several dimen-
sions. The result is in accordance with intuition, namely that economies of
scope are associated with the emergence of a unique quality leader in all
dimensions. By contrast, diseconomies of scope lead to what one may term
cross leadership, that is, each firm is quality leader in a diﬀerent dimen-
sion. In our model too, however, if quality improvements were obtained at
zero-cost or with separable costs, strategic interaction would lead to: quality
leadership by one firm along the hedonic characteristic and to zero diﬀer-
entiation in the other characteristic, in accordance with the existing theory.
Therefore, the analysis below shows that, as soon as there are interlinked
costs of improvements in diﬀerent attributes, the outcome of strategic inter-
action is drastically modified. This opens up for further refinements in the
theory of vertical diﬀerentiation.
2 Costless Quality Improvements
In a market for an indivisible good produced by two firms, the quality of a
good depends upon two attributes, x and y. Consider a population of buyers
with taste parameter θ uniformly distributed over the [0, 1] interval. Their
utility is given by
u = x+ yθ − p
if they buy one unit of the good, and zero otherwise. Characteristic x can
be called the ’non-hedonic’ or ’homogeneous taste characteristic’ and y the
’hedonic’ or ’heterogeneous taste characteristic’.
The two firms are indexed as firm 1 and firm 2. The competition process
is described by a two stage game. At stage 1 firms choose the product quality
attributes xi and yi, for i = 1, 2. At stage two they choose prices, p1 and
p2. We limit here the action space at the first stage assuming that both x
and y must belong to technically feasible intervals, [x0, x00], and [y0, y00] , with
x0 > 0 and y0 > 0. Let dx = x2 − x1 and dy = y2 − y1. Assume, without
loss of generality, dy > 0. Also. assume for the time being that dx > 0 as
well (the relation between dy and dx shall become apparent in the analysis
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in Section 3). The consumer indiﬀerent between product 1 and 2 is defined
by the consumer with taste parameter θ˜ :.
θ˜ = (p2 − p1 + dx)/dy.
The demand to firm 2, is then equal to
D2(p1, p2) = 1− (p2 − p1 + dx)/dy
if p2 ∈ [(p1 + dx), (dy − dx + p1)], it is equal to zero if p2 > dy − dx + p1 and
it is equal to 1 if 0 < p2 < p1 + dx.
The demand to firm 1, is then equal to
D1(p1, p2) = (p2 − p1 + dx)/dy
if p1 ∈ [(p2 + dx − dy), (p2 + dx)], it is equal to zero if p1 > p2+ dx , and it is
equal to one if p1 < p2 + dx − dy.
First, we analyze the case where firms incur no production costs. This
will allow us to describe the pure incentives towards quality choices. Simple
calculations show that the second stage equilibrium prices are
p1 =
dy − dx
3
, p2 =
2dy + dx
3
and the corresponding profits are
Π1(dy, dx) =
(dy − dx)2
9dy
, Π2(dy, dx) =
(2dy + dx)2
9dy
.
The equilibrium quantities are D1 =
dy − dx
3dy
and D2 =
2dy + dx
3dy
, there-
fore at equilibrium firm 1 survives only if dy − dx > 0 (this condition would
be met more easily if dx were negative, so our assumption that dx > 0 is
more restrictive than necessary to make competition by firm 1 viable). It is
easy to see then that the choices at the first stage are determined uniquely
by the sign of the derivatives of the equilibrium profits with respect to dy
and dx.
In particular, since
∂Π1
∂dx
= −2(dy − dx)
9dy
3
this implies that
∂Π1
∂x1
> 0.
This means that unambiguously, firm 1 (i.e., the firm with the lower quality)
chooses x1 = x00 as a best reply to any possible choice by firm 2. Similarly,
∂Π2
∂dx
=
2(2dy + dx)
9dy
,
which is always positive. Therefore
∂Π2
∂x2
> 0.
The sign of the derivatives of the profit functions with respect to the non
hedonic variable, then imply that there is a quality race in this characteristic.
This means that first stage choices under the pure incentives will lead to
x1 = x2 = x00.
Then, consider the choices of y1 and y2, the hedonic characteristic. One
has
∂Π1
∂dy
=
d2y + dydx − d2x
9d2y
> 0,
and
∂Π2
∂dy
=
4d2y − d2x
9d2y
> 0.
Therefore firm 1 will choose y1 = y0 as a best reply against any possible pair
(x0, y2), and firm 2 will choose y2 = y00 against any possible pair (x0, y1) by firm
1. This implies that the pure incentives point toward maximal diﬀerentiation
in y. The results so far can be summarized in the following Proposition.
Proposition 1 Pure profit incentives lead to maximal quality level (zero dif-
ferentiation) by both firms in the non hedonic characteristic and to maximal
diﬀerentiation in the hedonic characteristic.
The above Proposition relates pure incentives to a unique equilibrium
configuration. The question is, then, whether this configuration can be al-
tered when the costs of ameliorating the good are considered.
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3 Properties of Technology and Quality Lead-
ership
We shall define the following possible cases. Double quality leadership by
one firm: this happens when at equilibrium the firms’ choices are such that
yi > yj and xi > xj, for i, j = 1, 2, and i 6= j. Cross quality leadership: this
happens when at equilibrium the firms’ choices are such that either the two
inequalities yi > yj and xi < xj, both hold, or yi < yj and xi > xj both
hold, for i, j = 1, 2, and i 6= j. Finally, single quality leadership obtains when
either yi 6= yj and xi = xj both hold, or yi = yj and xi 6= xj both hold, for
i, j = 1, 2, and i 6= j.
Cost functions summarize the available technology. The cost function of
producing quantity z is assumed to be given by
Ci(z) = cz + F (xi, yi),
where c is a constant marginal cost and F (x, y) is a fixed cost which depends
upon the quality choices. Since the variable cost is assumed not to depend
upon the quality variables, we shall assume henceforth that c = 0. The
function F (xi, yi) is assumed to be continuous and with continuous first and
second derivatives in both arguments, over the admissible ranges. Its first
derivatives are assumed to be both positive for all values strictly larger than
x0 and y0 respectively: Fx(x, y) > 0 for x > x0 and Fy(x, y) > 0 for y > y0;
also, Fx(x, y) = 0 for x = x0 and Fy(x, y) = 0 for y = y0. Second derivatives
are denoted by Fxx(x, y), Fyy(x, y) and Fxy(x, y). The second cross derivative
Fxy(x, y) plays a special role in the remainder.
The cost function is said to exhibit diseconomies of scope in characteristics
if Fxy(x, y) > 0. And it is said to exhibit economies of scope in characteristics
if Fxy(x, y) < 0. The cost function is separable if Fxy(x, y) = 0.
The analysis of the first stage choices can make use of the results for the
case of pure incentives analyzed in Section 2 above. Define the profits net of
fixed costs as Πi = πi − F (xi, yi)
To start, consider the choice of firm 1, where for a convention and without
loss of generality it is assumed that y2 ≥ y1. Then clearly,
∂π1
∂y1
= −∂Π1
∂dy
− ∂F
∂y1
since from the results in Section 2 and from the assumptions on the deriva-
tives of F (x, y) this derivative is always negative, then one has that y1 = y0,
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i.e., that the inclusion of cost does not change the choice of the firm with low
quality in the heterogeneous dimension. It is useful to save this result as a
lemma.
Lemma 2 For all technologies, there is always a low quality firm in the
hedonic characteristic y. This firm is denoted as firm 1, and it chooses the
minimum quality y1 = y
0
, irrespective of the choice made by the rival firm.
As to firm 2, its choice of quality variable y, when it is interior3, will
derive from the first order condition
∂π2
∂y2
=
∂Π2
∂dy
− ∂F
∂y2
= 0.
Since the term
∂Π2
∂dy
is positive, and Fy(x, y) = 0 for y = y0, this condition
leads to y2 > y0. This is true obviously also when
∂π2
∂dy
− ∂F
∂y
> 0 for all
values of y2, i.e., when the result is y = y00. This can also be summarized by
a lemma.
Lemma 3 For all technologies, there exists a high quality firm in the hedonic
characteristic y. This firm is denoted as firm 2, and its choice y2 is strictly
larger than y0.
The choice of the quality level in the non hedonic space can be analyzed
in turn. Assume first that there are economies of scope. Then, the choice
of the hedonic level y1 = y0 against y2 > y0 is reflected in the property that
the first derivative for firm 1, Fx(x, y1), for all levels of x is higher than the
corresponding derivative for firm 2. In other words, firm 2 has an endogenous
cost advantage in the production of high quality in the x characteristic if
it has a leadership in the y characteristic. Indeed, recalling that the pure
incentives
∂Π2
∂dx
and
∂Π1
∂dx
are of opposite sign, and that
∂Π2
∂dx
> −∂Π1
∂dx
> 0,
then for x1 = x2
∂π2
∂x2
=
∂Π2
∂dx
− ∂F (x, y2)
∂x2
,
3Given the assumption that ∂F (x2, y2)/∂y2 is continuous over all admissible region of
(x, y) values, and that it is equal to zero when y2 = y0, if the solution is not interior it
must be y2 = y00.
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will be larger than
∂π1
∂x1
= −∂Π1
∂dx
− ∂F (x, y2)
∂x1
.
It follows that the incentive to increase quality in the x dimension is larger
for firm 2 than for firm 1. This leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 4 If the cost function exhibits economies of scope in charac-
teristics, then the unique equilibrium outcome entails double leadership in
qualities by one of the two firms.
Proposition 4 implies that if there is complementarity in quality improve-
ments, through the cost function, vertical diﬀerentiation spills over from the
hedonic to the non hedonic characteristic and a better quality brand is better
in all attributes.
Assume, by contrast, that there are diseconomies of scope, i.e., that
Fxy(x, y) > 0. Then, the nature of the argument leading to lemma 1 and
lemma 2 is unaltered. This implies that the firm which has an advantage in
the hedonic quality y will have an endogenous cost disadvantage in the non
hedonic quality, x. Then it is immediate to verify that firm 1, i.e., the firm
with the lowest value of y, will be lead to choose a higher level of x than its
rival firm 2.
Therefore, the existence of diseconomies of scope is unambiguously asso-
ciated to an outcome of cross leadership.
Proposition 5 If the cost function exhibits diseconomies of scope in char-
acteristics, the unique equilibrium outcome entails cross leadership. One of
the two firms chooses a higher level of x than the rival, but a lower level of
y.
Finally,
Proposition 6 If the cost function is separable (no scope eﬀects) at equilib-
rium the products are identical in the non hedonic attribute and are maximally
diﬀerentiated in the hedonic one.
The case with separable costs is obviously one where the existence of
costs in the production of quality does not interfere with pure incentives. The
optimal choices then will then lead to single quality leadership. In particular,
the hedonic characteristic will be diﬀerentiated, while the non hedonic will
be the same across firms. The opposite, however, is not possible.
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4 Conclusion
The analysis of vertical diﬀerentiation traditionally leads to the prediction
that a single attribute shall be used to strategically diﬀerentiate products
so as to relax price competition. This obviously implies the emergence of a
single firm as the quality leader. The present paper shows that this need not
be the case. If there are scope economies in increasing the good’s attributes,
then a quality leader emerges in all attributes. If there are diseconomies of
scope, then a situation of cross leadership arises, with one firm producing a
better product in terms of the hedonic attribute and the other supplying a
better good in terms of the non hedonic attribute.
These results are conveyed by a specific model, as usual in the literature
on vertical diﬀerentiation. Generalizations and extensions are left for future
research.
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